

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

63-00132

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. ISMIRALEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.P.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. J. BUCEK
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ
Mr. A. de ICAZA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECCOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of the
Acting Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the eighty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker for today I should like to inform the Conference that I have been requested by the Secretariat to point out to members of the Committee that more accurate interpretation of their statements would be possible if they were to supply the Secretariat with five advance copies of their texts. It would also be helpful in this connexion if representatives would be kind enough to read their prepared statements slowly.

In my capacity as Chairman, may I suggest that the Conference might find it profitable if the members of the nuclear Sub-Committee could provide the plenary Committee with a report on the meetings held by them during our recess.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): During our two-and-a-half months' recess, mankind has passed through the most difficult moment in international relations since the end of the Second World War. The Caribbean crisis brought us to the verge of an outbreak of the most devastating war ever known -- a thermonuclear conflict. This time again, reason triumphed and the danger was averted. But has it been completely averted? No affirmative answer can be given to this question as long as the most vital problem of our times, general and complete disarmament, has not been solved once and for all, that is, until a final solution has been found for the challenge that faces us in this Committee.

The resumption of the proceedings of our Committee proves that despite the tense international situation of a month ago, despite all difficulties, the will of the peoples for peace is more powerful -- that this will for peace is the essential determining element in international relations. Peoples want peace, they want the tranquillity necessary to create the material and spiritual assets which the present generation needs, which future generations will need for their progress. War cannot give them all this: on the contrary.

Returning to this conference table, the Romanian delegation is fully conscious of the great force which the will for peace of the peoples represents. At the same time it is conscious of the great responsibility incumbent upon this Committee. No government, no delegation, no representative can evade this responsibility, because the judgement of history, and of those who make history -- the peoples -- is just and inexorable.

The problems facing us are difficult and complex. Nobody denies this. But if we had not deemed their solution possible, we would not have started this Conference. We are persuaded that if we take into account the general interests of humanity at this moment when the danger of devastating and ir retrievable destruction has grown immensely; if we approach the issues in a realistic and concrete manner; if, in debating the problems thoroughly and with courage, we sincerely unite our efforts in order to find solutions -- then we shall fulfil the task entrusted to this Committee by the United Nations General Assembly.

As I have emphasized on former occasions, the main danger which menaces mankind is that of a devastating nuclear war. To safeguard the peoples from the calamities of a nuclear catastrophe, to take drastic steps meant to assure a lasting peace on our planet -- this is the most urgent and the most burning problem of the contemporary world. The radical way to fulfil this aim is the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The main task of our Committee is precisely that of working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. It is not our intention to deny or to underestimate the existence, importance and urgency of other problems, such as the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the adoption of other measures which would lead to the improvement of the international situation, to the promoting of confidence between States and to assuring favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament; but the main issue and the principal task which today challenges the world and our Committee is general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Throughout our proceedings we must not for a moment overlook this. Nothing must deflect us from this paramount goal. Without a clear view of what is most important in the activities of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee we cannot ensure the correct orientation of our proceedings, which is indispensable for success.

The Romanian delegation is firmly convinced that general and complete disarmament must above all liberate humanity from the nightmare of nuclear war. This aspect of the problem has acquired an ever-growing specific weight during the eight months that have elapsed since this Committee began its work. Super-saturated stockpiles of nuclear weapons have remained untouched: none of those weapons has been destroyed; none of the plants manufacturing them has stopped

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working. On the contrary, to the existing stockpiles new weapons have been added. The process of the expansion, improvement and diversification of weapons has continued, and still continues. Consequently the nuclear stockpiles grow like Topsy. Obviously the danger that threatens to annihilate entire countries and peoples has become even greater. Hence the urgency of the abolition of the nuclear danger.

In our efforts to solve this imperative problem we must all keep in mind that time and tide wait for no man. Every day of delay entails untold risks.

The Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/II) submitted to this Committee offers a workable solution for the elimination of the nuclear danger from the very first stage of the process of disarmament. It provides for the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage. That is a radical solution, which corresponds to the qualitatively new military situation which mankind is facing today. Obviously, without means of delivery the nuclear weapons are bound to rust in their stockpiles, proving thus their futility, and to lose all their importance. By approaching the problem in this manner we would solve it completely and in a short space of time, even down to the stage of destroying the nuclear weapons themselves, and thus mankind would be saved from great danger.

The Western nuclear Powers try to convince us that it is impossible to accept such a proposal, bringing forward arguments which never come up to the importance of the problem, the immediate elimination of the danger of nuclear war, and which never come up to the level of the great political and moral task of our time -- safeguarding mankind against the possibilities of destruction by the nuclear weapons now in existence and those which are being manufactured.

These arguments, accompanied by mathematical, geographical and strategic considerations, have not been able to convince us as to the essence of the issue. They are not able to demonstrate that the Soviet solution is not and does not remain the best one. Nevertheless, after re-examining the situation that has been created as a result of the categorical refusal of the Western Powers to destroy all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, the Soviet Government has come forward to meet the positions of those Powers and has proposed, as an exception to the rule, that in the course of the process of destroying nuclear weapon delivery vehicles the United States and the Soviet Union should maintain on

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their territories a strictly limited number of intercontinental, anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles (ENDC/2/Rev.1/p.5). In our opinion this is a proposal of exceptional importance, which opens up real possibilities for the conclusion of an agreement on this issue at an early date.

It is known that the United States opposed the abolition of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage, invoking the reason -- which we believe is groundless -- that such a measure would unfavourably affect the Western Powers. In the new conditions such an objection can no longer have any justification. If the United States and its allies are guided by the sincere desire to reach agreement, they now have the opportunity to contribute to the positive and undelayed solution of this issue.

At the last meeting we listened to comments concerning the new proposal of the Soviet Government by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy. Those comments boiled down, in essence, to the voicing of certain demands for clarification regarding the ways of implementing that proposal, and especially the details of control over the measures proposed. Of course, should an agreement in principle concerning the new Soviet proposal be reached, one could pass to the examination of all further aspects of this issue connected with its implementation, including the number of the above-mentioned missiles and the methods of control over the carrying out of those measures. All these aspects are naturally important, but they are subordinate to the reaching of agreement in principle with regard to the new Soviet proposal. Solutions would not be difficult to find if all parties agreed to the proposed measures and co-operated in the working out of arrangements with regard to their implementation. That being so, would it not be more logical to let the clarification of the technical problems be preceded by the adoption by the Western Powers of a clear stand with regard to the new Soviet proposal?

General and complete disarmament will become possible only if we take into account to an equal extent the right of all States to ensure their security. This idea permeates the principles of the joint statement of agreed principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), unanimously endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, by which we must be guided in our proceedings. Hence the logical conclusion that, parallel with the elimination

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of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, military bases on foreign territories must be liquidated and all armed forces stationed on the territories of other States withdrawn. One cannot conceive of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage without the simultaneous liquidation of all United States military bases located on foreign territories close to the borders of socialist States. To act otherwise would be tantamount to creating a situation in which the right to security of the socialist States would be disregarded, and that cannot be admitted. The logic of the facts demands that the United States, which recently evinced so great a concern for its own security, should understand the preoccupation of the socialist States with their security, which is threatened by the United States military bases located on the territories of other States.

While the problem of general and complete disarmament must concern us in the first place and above all, this does not, naturally, exclude the possibility and usefulness of certain measures being adopted intended to promote the lessening of international tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament.

The establishment of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world would constitute such a measure. The Romanian delegation considers that the establishment of nuclear-free zones on the European continent would be of great political importance. The Romanian People's Republic supports the proposal made by the People's Republic of Poland concerning the establishment of such a zone in Central Europe (EDOC/S.1/1).

Being convinced that each country must make its own contribution to the cause of maintaining and consolidating peace, the Romanian Government had already proposed in 1957 that an agreement should be reached among the States of the Balkan area. The Romanian People's Republic has been and is striving to turn this area into a region of peace and co-operation. It is obvious that the conclusion of a treaty of mutual understanding and security, in order to turn the Balkan area into a zone of peace, free of nuclear weapons, foreign military bases and launching pads, would meet in the highest degree the interests of all the peoples of that area and would contribute to the improvement of the international situation as a whole.

The Romanian delegation is also in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those participating in the Warsaw Pact.

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We attach a particular importance to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. As we have repeatedly emphasized, the Romanian Government stands for the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments, by all States and for ever.

The recent debates on this issue that took place in the United Nations General Assembly have cast a spotlight on the urgency of this measure, on the possibility of its implementation and on the narrowing of the gap between the respective positions. The interests of the entire human race, the interests of international peace and security, as reflected in the recent debates of the United Nations General Assembly, demand the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, irrespective of the environment in which they are carried out.

What mankind is asking for is the halting of the armaments race, the halting of the process of perfecting nuclear weapons, the diminishing of tension in the world, the strengthening of international security. Obviously, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in certain environments only does not answer those requirements. In fact, if the possibility is left open for the continuation of underground tests, the armaments race and the improvement of nuclear weapons will continue, with all the risks this entails for peace and international security. New efforts must be made in order to overcome the last obstacles which still prevent us from reaching agreement and from fulfilling the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (1762 A (XVII)) that after 1 January 1963 no more nuclear weapon tests should take place.

At our last meeting opinions were voiced and suggestions were made regarding the improvement of the procedure of our work. To our mind, our procedure regulations are quite satisfactory. Of course we, too, think it advisable that, besides official contacts, the technique of unofficial contacts also should be used between the co-Chairmen as well as between other representatives.

It is essential however that in the framework of the official meetings, and equally during our unofficial contacts, we should all be guided by the endeavour to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties. To find such solutions good will and realism are required from all of us.

On 7 November 1962, while the Caribbean crisis was still going on, the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, made the following statement:

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"We are of the opinion that State leaders must show wisdom, patience and perseverance in order to solve by way of negotiations all existing differences". These are the thoughts which will guide the activity of the Romanian delegation throughout our negotiations. The Romanian delegation wishes all the members of this Committee wisdom, patience and perseverance in order to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, to welcome on behalf of the Romanian delegation, the presence among us of the representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tun Shein, and of the representative of Czechoslovakia, Deputy-Minister Karel Kurka, with our good wishes for great success in their mission.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): During the many years in which the question of the cessation of nuclear tests has been discussed, we have witnessed a strange shifting of positions -- retreats by one of the sides or by both in face of a threatened breakdown in the negotiations: an introduction of conditions, apparently unacceptable to the other side from the outset, in face of a "threatening" agreement.

Today, such an approach should no longer be possible. The assaults carried out during the last year against man's health, mind and nerves have made it clear that nuclear testing more than anything else is the acute, universal evil with which we have to deal right now. The General Assembly of the United Nations has, with profound justification, asked that this matter should be given absolute priority during our continued deliberations here in Geneva.

When I venture to intervene in this general debate, I therefore intend to confine myself to the question of a nuclear test ban, which, as the Acting Secretary-General pointed out in his message to the resumed Conference, must be regarded as "the indispensable first step to general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/PV.83, p.5)

If we look at the situation today we can observe many facts which, more than ever, ought to accelerate and facilitate our efforts to reach an agreement. Let me point out some of these facts.

First of all, it should be emphasized that the positions of the two sides have been brought considerably closer to each other since we took our seats around this table last spring. East and West have now agreed that it is possible to ban all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without an international machinery of verification. This is essential, since those are the tests most dangerous to man's life and well-being.

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Thus, the whole problem of an agreement regarding the discontinuance of nuclear tests has, in fact, been reduced to the question of underground tests. However important those underground tests may be, they nevertheless do represent only the smaller part of the problem. At the same time, we are all aware that the key to a durable solution, banning all tests in all elements for all time, is to be sought here.

Here also the gap has become smaller. On the basis of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28) the Western Powers have accepted a detection system based upon nationally manned observation posts -- something that they were originally opposed to. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has accepted the idea of an international commission -- an idea previously rejected by it. Also, with regard to the difficult question concerning on-site inspection, it seems that the positions have somewhat softened. A keen ear might have heard at least some indications of modification in the debate this autumn at the United Nations General Assembly. In this connexion it is of interest to note the favourable reception given by the representatives of both sides to the proposal of an early cut-off date. Prime Minister Khrushchev could thus state quite accurately in one of his messages to President Kennedy at the beginning of November that the views of the Soviet Union and the United States of America regarding a discontinuance of nuclear tests "are very close to each other". At about the same time Prime Minister Macmillan declared:

"The Western and Soviet positions do not appear to be far apart, though I must add that the small gulf has so far been unbridgeable".

My second observation is that the United Nations General Assembly recently paid great attention to the nuclear tests problem and adopted two resolutions on the subject (1762 A and B (XVII), see document ENDC/63). Thus the United Nations General Assembly has adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the thirty-seven Power resolution (1762 A (XVII)) which, without reservations, condemns all nuclear tests and demands their immediate cessation, and at the same time calls on the parties concerned, taking the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as a basis, to enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. accompanied by an interim arrangement to suspend all underground tests with adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.

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It is natural that this resolution contains stronger and more impelling language than any earlier resolution on this subject. It has to be regarded as an expression of world-wide opinion which has grown more and more restless and impatient and which, in spite of all previous appeals to the great Powers, has witnessed still more poisonous mushroom clouds rise from nuclear explosions -- explosions which, in times of peace, have released roughly 600 megatons of nuclear energy, or roughly about 200 times the amount of destructive energy released during the five years of the Second World War.

This resolution is far too serious to be allowed to become the object of sophisticated disputes of interpretation. Such disputes would be derisory to the hundreds of millions of human beings who stand behind this document. If one looks at the resolution as a whole -- and it should and must be read as a whole -- its purport is crystal clear. The first section contains a moral and humanitarian appeal from the non-nuclear nations who have never recognized any right of the nuclear Powers to expose the environment of this earth to hazards. Behind this is the most ardent desire to achieve a quick ending of all nuclear tests, preferably before the end of this year.

The second section of the resolution (1762 B (XVII)) urgently asks for a binding agreement which can free the world from continued nuclear tests for all time. The majority of the supporters of this resolution do not attach great importance to the formula for such an agreement: the main thing is that it should be effective and complied with. The details and modalities are left to this Conference -- and, first of all, to the nuclear Powers themselves -- to work out. This part of the resolution contains, above all, a strong endorsement and massive support of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as an instrument with which to reach agreement. Therefore, we think that the non-aligned members of this Conference can return to this table after the recess conscious that they can speak in the name of an overwhelming and world-wide public opinion.

A third fact that should be recalled is the report, filled with facts, submitted this autumn by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, a committee in which several of our most prominent experts on radiation have been represented. That report contains a very serious warning, expressed in strict and scientific language, against continued nuclear weapon tests. Nobody can indifferently pass over the Committee's remark that:

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"the effects of any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully manifested for several decades in the case of somatic disease, and for many generations in the case of genetic damage" (A/5216, paragraph 51).

The conclusion of the report speaks to us in no uncertain terms:

"The Committee therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed. ... As there are no effective measures to prevent the occurrence of harmful effects of global radioactive contamination from nuclear explosions, the achievement of a final cessation of nuclear tests would benefit present and future generations of mankind." (ibid., paragraph 52).

Also outside the United Nations radiation committee a series of warnings have been voiced. The well-known Nobel prize winner, Mr. Linus Pauling, recently declared that, according to his estimates, 16 million children in the generations to come will die at birth or be born with serious defects because of the tests carried out until now. Even though all such estimates must of necessity be uncertain approximations, the scientists seem to agree that one cannot exclude the fact that the tests already carried out will have harmful consequences for millions of human beings not yet born. More tests will continually increase the risks.

A fourth element of significance is the technical development in the field of seismology which may have opened up certain new vistas.

Before adjourning at the beginning of September we were informed that Projects Vela and Orpheus had indicated that considerable progress had been made as regards long range detection. It seemed to imply that, however large a country may be, it is possible to detect, from outside its borders, nuclear explosions and earthquakes of a corresponding size by means of advanced instrumentation. Certainly, detection is not equal to identification. But it was apparently concluded that detection had been rendered more difficult through the possibility of registering every phenomenon in many countries.

The Soviet Union and United States scientists who participated in the Pugwash Conference in London at the beginning of September, although proceeding along other lines, arrived at a similar conclusion, which was embodied in a common statement that attracted a great deal of attention. Both the Eastern and Western

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scientists had made the proposal of the eight non-aligned States their point of departure. On the basis of this proposal they examined the possibility of developing a system

"in such a way as to provide a minimal interference with the host country, and still obtain a maximum amount of completely objective seismic information for the International Control Commission so that it will substantially reduce the number of necessary on-site inspections" (ENDC/66, p.1).

In the operative part of their resolution these scientists --- three from the United States and three from the Soviet Union --- proposed that automatic recording stations, so-called "black boxes", should be used. These should be sealed in such a way that they could not be tampered with, and they would be self-contained. The instruments should be periodically returned to the international commission for inspection, replacement, repair, and so on. There should be a sufficient number of stations to permit of seismic events being recorded on many instruments. The sealed automatic seismographs to be placed in the Soviet Union could be manufactured in the United States, and vice versa.

The United States and Soviet Union scientists at the Pugwash Conference concluded their common document with the following words:

"We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections. If this is true, it may provide a new basis for negotiations in the Geneva discussions and ease the problem of resolving the on-site inspection issue." (ibid., p.2).

Similar ideas have been brought forward from other quarters, inter alia, by two prominent seismologists at Harvard University who, departing from the eight-Power plan and the Pugwash Conference, have developed a system for utilizing the "black boxes". Although such automatic stations are not capable of one hundred per cent identification, they may reduce the number of events which cannot be identified with a certain degree of accuracy. These "black boxes" do not per se solve all problems. However, they may be a rather useful complementary device. For under water stations in the deep sea they seem to be the only possibility.

The question of inspection that up to now has been our stumbling block has not been removed from our agenda by the achievements made so far in the field of

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seismology. But the cumulative effect of these improvements has simplified the problem both as to control, which has been so strongly emphasized by one side, and as to the safeguarding of national security, which has been put in the foreground by the other side.

A fifth significant element when we now resume our debate is the existence at present of a factual discontinuation of tests in the atmosphere. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have recently concluded their extensive series of tests. Our deliberations in this conference room need no longer be conducted against the irritating background music of nuclear explosions in the East and the West. The silence that has fallen over the testing grounds on Novaya Zemlya and in the Pacific Ocean should promote sincerity and détente in our negotiations. Providing that restraint is also exercised with regard to underground tests it would seem that we are entering a period when testing has, in fact, ceased. It is certainly our right to expect that this will be more than a passing period: that the sudden silence over the testing grounds shall be used to hammer out a treaty that will outlaw tests in all environments for all time.

Finally, there have been recently certain happenings in the international arena that should have contributed to creating a more favourable political atmosphere for our discussions. We are all very conscious of how close we were to the fateful threshold not long ago, and how fraught with momentous consequences even a minor incautious step or miscalculation could have been during those days. However, at the same time, we felt relieved to note a responsible desire to solve a difficult problem before the fatal circle had been inexorably closed. Both these aspects should, I think, be useful to our work here.

All these elements which I have permitted myself to mention -- the increased and more impatient pressure of world opinion, the warnings of the scientists, the new technical achievements, the factual discontinuation of the tests which we now have, and the conclusions which we should be entitled to draw from recent events -- ought to facilitate our negotiations and expedite the reaching of an agreement. The real differences between the two parties are now so small that they would not justify the two Powers ignoring world opinion by not taking advantage of this situation to secure an effective and permanent agreement.

The General Assembly has requested a new report on this matter by 10 December. This gives us no time for exercises in polemics, but time only for work -- work in a sincere spirit to reach concrete results.

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Thus, what we should do today is to find a suitable point of departure for such constructive work. This should be looked for, in the first instance, in a field where there is a wide area of agreement between the parties.

If we study the verbatim records of the Conference and of its Sub-Committee -- and also of the meetings of the Sub-Committee during the recess -- we find an evident conformity of views on the scientific commission which is to be the heart and nerve centre of the control system. It is true that, so far, there has been no detailed discussion with regard to the size and composition of a commission. It is true also that there are different views on the question of inspection. But apart from that there is a wide area of agreement in principle as to the functions of the commission as indicated in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries (ENDC/28). It should therefore be possible to establish a commission with those functions on which the parties can reach a preliminary agreement without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement.

This idea is not new. My delegation has touched upon it earlier on several occasions. I refer to statements at the plenary meetings on 8 June (ENDC/PV.53), on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64) and on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77). With permission, I shall quote a few words from my statement of 31 August:

"Would it not be worthwhile to consider now the establishment, at least on an interim basis, of the commission proposed in the eight-Power memorandum, about which the Parties are in agreement, with, as a first task, the scientific examination of the question of how a control system should be organized? We believe that that would extend the area of agreement and thereby also facilitate our endeavours to arrive at a permanent test ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.77, p.32)

At that time the idea was strongly endorsed inter alia by the delegations of Burma, Mexico and the United Arab Republic. It was further elaborated in a statement on behalf of the Swedish delegation by Mrs. Alva Myrdal when the test ban question was discussed in the First Committee of the United Nations. Similar views were then also expressed by inter alia Canada, Cyprus, Norway, Yugoslavia and New Zealand.

When my delegation now reverts to this question our intention is to give that idea a more definite form than in our earlier interventions at this Conference. We consider that the time has now come directly to request the nuclear Powers immediately and without awaiting the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement to

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call in a panel of scientists from different countries, especially seismologists, leaving it to this panel to act for the time being as an interim commission.

It is indeed difficult to see how we shall be able to comply with the task which has been assigned to us by the United Nations General Assembly without some arrangement of that kind. As I have just recalled, the United Nations resolution has two parts: first, a request that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately, and not later than 1 January 1963; and, secondly, a demand that a final agreement banning all tests above the earth's crust should be worked out, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests. These two parts are inter-related and complementary; but they need to be cemented together. A panel of scientists entrusted with such authority that it could serve as an interim commission would be a link and a joining medium.

The situation when we parted in September was that both sides were prepared to enter into a final arrangement banning the most spectacular and dangerous tests. A condition of the Soviet Union was, however, that an understanding should be reached simultaneously to refrain from underground tests. The Western Powers replied that they could not accept an uncontrolled moratorium. Did these opposite views mean that the road had been blocked? Were we again in the well-known situation where each of the parties made conditions unacceptable to the other side when an agreement seemed "threateningly" close? We refused to accept such a conclusion and we refuse to accept it today. We felt -- and I permit myself to quote again from my statement of 31 August --

"... that there are still certain lines and combinations which the nuclear Powers could and should carefully consider in a serious effort to find a common platform." (ENDC/PV.77, p.36)

We imagine that it should be possible to reach agreement on a moratorium on underground tests limited in time while the details of a comprehensive test ban agreement are being worked out. A time limit seems realistic as it would hardly be technically possible to iron out a comprehensive agreement before 1 January, whereas, on the other hand, it would be unreasonable to have this work going on ad calendas graecas. The vacuum between the positions of the two parties could, during such a provisional cessation of tests, be filled by the proposed scientific panel acting as an interim commission.

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Probably such a panel should be given a direct mandate by the Eighteen Nation Conference. But it would be an advantage if the nomination of scientists from different countries could be made by some independent, purely scientific and non-political institution, such as the International Committee of Geophysics.

Such a panel would be of value by providing the Conference, and in the first place its nuclear Sub-Committee, with technical and scientific information and certain investigations. In view of what I have already said, it is, however, our opinion that its tasks should by no means be limited to such preparatory studies.

The panel should, under the auspices of the Conference and in co-operation with the Sub-Committee, be able to start building up the whole international machinery. It should be of essential importance in the technical elaboration of the detection system and the data exchange. It should be able to provide practical, valuable experience for the construction and detailed functioning of a more permanent commission. Here as in so many other fields of life there is certainly truth in the words of Mirabeau that a journey seems different to a man who makes it in reality from what it seems to one who undertakes his travels on a map.

In order that the panel should be able to act as an interim commission, it should be explicitly entrusted with certain basic functions which the eight-Power memorandum has envisaged for the permanent commission and on which there is agreement between both sides. Above all this is the case with the scientific and non-political evaluation of data from already existing -- and to a great extent also co-operating -- national observation posts.

In practice the functioning of such a system would mean that the measuring and detection of relevant geophysical phenomena would be carried out, just as now, by different national observation posts and that the data recorded, more or less processed, would be distributed to all interested research institutes throughout the world. Until the site for a permanent commission had been agreed upon, one of the existing research institutes -- in this connexion I may refer to the data centres, for instance, in Kew and in Strasbourg -- could serve an interim commission and be responsible for the necessary processing and interpretation of the material received.

It would be for the commission to judge the material from a test ban point of view and to consider the character of relevant data and the need for further

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

information. Such a system would mean that only the small group of persons of which the interim commission would consist, together with a computation group, would be concerned with the test ban question itself. All the other personnel within the observation network and the research institutes would work for other purposes and would not have to think at all of the test ban as such.

To be able to fulfil its functions the interim commission must be furnished with modern electronic equipment for processing data and be able to rely upon speedy communications. The organization of the meteorological data exchange could serve as a model. In fact this is the first point where there would be any substantial costs for the provisional organization. Whether these should be carried by the parties concerned or through internationally available means might be a question for negotiation. In any case the expenses would be small compared to the costs of the nuclear tests.

It would certainly be of interest if the interim commission, for its comparative studies, could be supplied with the geophysical records of the past two years, when a number of man-made underground explosions were carried out and recorded.

It should once more be emphasized that what I have tried to outline here refers only to an interim organization designed to fill a vacuum in connexion with a provisional and time-limited ban on underground tests. But at the same time it is evident that whatever road we choose, if we start our journey tomorrow or much later, we must start from certain provisional and temporary conditions.

Even if we could sign a final text tomorrow, that would not mean that we received the organization ready-made. It would not be born as Pallas Athene suddenly springing out of the head of Jupiter. With all respect for my distinguished colleagues here, I do not think that any one of them, not even among those representing the great Powers, considers himself in a position to compete with the gods of Olympus. Even under the Western proposal for a comprehensive agreement (ENDC/53) there would be a certain provisional stage before the system had been built up. According to the experts' proposal of 1958 (EXP/WG/28) a building-up period of several years was envisaged. The Western draft of 27 August this year implies that the control machinery could not start functioning until at best six to twelve months after the entry into force of an agreement.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Under such circumstances it is difficult to see that any well-founded objections could be made against a time-limited moratorium during which a scientific panel acting as an interim commission would start building up the central control machinery. The advantages of such an arrangement seem obvious. Valuable experience could be gained while the elaboration of the agreement went on; a considerable amount of preparatory work would have been carried out once the agreement came into force; and no more time would be wasted. It would, at the same time, greatly reduce the risk which the Western nuclear Powers believe to be inherent in a so-called uncontrolled moratorium, because there would be the amount of control that it is possible to achieve step by step in the course of a building-up period.

I have not spoken about verification in loco under a provisional test ban. It is natural that if the great Powers undertake to refrain during a certain time from all underground tests without having built up a control system legally inscribed in an agreement such verifications can only take place in casu. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, touched upon this in his statement in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 October last. After having recalled that there are different possibilities for bridging the remaining controversies in the control question, and after having pointed to the possibilities of a time limited moratorium while waiting for, inter alia, the further development of seismological instrumentation, he stated:

"It would also be possible to provide guarantees against the misuse of the obligation to subject oneself to a certain degree of inspection in such a way that a group of eminent scientists from politically independent countries could be entrusted with the task of deciding, on a purely scientific and technical basis, if an inspection was necessary in order to establish the nature of earth tremor". (A/C. 1/PV.1252, p.22)

It is clear that if possibilities were opened for a scientific panel to make observations on the spot by a team specially assigned for that task, in case of doubt as to the origin of a recorded seismic event, this would be of great value from many points of view. It seems to me that the interpretation of the often-quoted statement of Mr. Kuznetsov in this Conference on 17 August last (ENDC/PV.71) could well be that the Soviet side does not object to the opening up of such a possibility.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

The establishment of a provisional commission of the kind I have tried to outline would mean the implementation of the recommendation of the General Assembly to the nuclear Powers about an interim agreement suspending all underground tests. It would comply with the demand that such an interim arrangement should include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission. Consequently, it would also make it possible for the nuclear Powers -- in accordance with the request of the General Assembly -- to enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Finally, it should perhaps be emphasized that a provisional arrangement under a temporary ban on underground tests, as asked for in paragraph 6 of the thirty-seven Power resolution, would in no way prejudice the final shape of a test ban agreement.

A scientific panel acting as an interim commission could give valuable practical experience but would not forestall the final organization, the elaboration of which would remain the task of the Conference and in the first place of the nuclear Powers.

I have here -- just as earlier when we have discussed a permanent agreement -- been anxious to emphasize strongly the purely scientific and non-political character of an international monitoring machinery. For the Swedish delegation this is essential. Scientists have shown a remarkable ability to co-operate across all national and ideological frontiers and to find out the scientifically objective truth even in cases where the basic material has been incomplete or pre-arranged. We must count upon science working and analysing objectively as our foremost ally.

A scientific panel with the tasks I have outlined here could be very useful and valuable during the difficult interim stage when an international machinery is to be set up. As to planning in the longer run, we should be able to take advantage of the developments now taking place in the seismological field. In international seismological circles a proposal has recently been put forward that a world centre should be established at which data should be collected from fifteen regional centres together covering the whole globe. This proposal is very much in line with an Economic and Social Council resolution (912 (XXXIV)) which was considered by the General Assembly this autumn, aiming at more effective international co-operation in the field of seismological research. Its main purpose is to create a readiness against damages caused by earthquakes, and tsunamis -- seismic sea waves.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

But such an organization is also of extreme interest in connexion with possible man-made explosions. To us who, just like the other non-aligned delegations at this Conference, have maintained that instead of building up an expensive separate monitoring system one should basically rely on the normal exchange of data motivated by scientific fervour and free from political side-glances, such a proposal seems almost like the answer to a prayer.

The extension of international scientific co-operation in this field should be stimulated and accelerated. It will nevertheless be a somewhat time-consuming process. This also speaks in favour of a provisional arrangement.

Above all, however, we have to explore the situation in which we find ourselves at present. A heavy responsibility rests here on four countries, three of which are represented around this table while the fourth is unfortunately not occupying a seat and not fulfilling its obligations here. It is those four Powers, and they alone, which have continued nuclear testing in spite of the alarm which it has caused all over the world. It is high time that they listened to the anguished voices of the billions of people living beyond their frontiers.

There are also voices of warning within their own countries. I recently read a statement -- it happened to be by a Soviet expert though it might just as well have been by one of the scientists in the West. The statement was reproduced in The Scientific World: Journal of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and reads:

"We must clearly understand that if testing of nuclear bombs is continued to a point where the danger deriving from them is only too obvious to everyone, it will be too late."

If we do not act very soon it might be too late because we do not know how long the favourable circumstances will last which now seem to facilitate an agreement. Too late because without a binding agreement we cannot feel sure that tests may not be resumed. Too late also because new countries may then enter the "atomic club" and complicate the issue still further.

History, which to a great extent is a graveyard of lost opportunities, has much to teach us about the role of psychological moments. It may be that we have just now such a psychological opportunity to remove the threat which hangs over mankind.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): As I am speaking in the Committee for the first time, I consider it my duty to thank the representative of the Soviet Union who, as Chairman of the last meeting, welcomed those of us who were taking part in the work of the Committee for the first time. I should also like to express my thanks to all my other colleagues who associated themselves with the kind words of the Chairman, including the representative of the United Kingdom who welcomed us in his own way, linking our presence with certain hopes regarding the added wisdom of the Committee. Speaking frankly, we have not the slightest doubt about the wisdom of all the members of this Committee, including Mr. Godber whom we know very well from the days in New York. It seems to me that the problem of the success of our efforts lies not only in the collective wisdom of our Committee but above all in the sense of responsibility and goodwill of the parties concerned. It is to this aspect of our efforts that almost all the previous speakers have drawn attention. In the general debate that has taken place so far it is characteristic that almost all the delegates have quite rightly pointed out the fact that the recent serious crisis in the Caribbean area has emphasized once again the utmost urgency of the task which this Committee is called upon to accomplish. The correctness of the conclusion contained in the resolution adopted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today, has been fully confirmed. These recent events during which the world was on the brink of a nuclear missile war have emphasized very forcibly the urgent need to solve the problem of disarmament and have thereby increased the responsibility of our Committee. Thanks to the consistent peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union it was possible to transfer the solution of the crisis to the sphere of negotiations. This fact is, in our opinion, an encouraging factor also in the further work of the Eighteen Nation Committee. Today no one can deny any longer that the danger of a nuclear war is the greatest threat to the peoples of the whole world. For this reason the Committee's main attention must be directed precisely towards eliminating this danger. We are convinced that the first priority task of the Committee is to achieve agreement on measures, the implementation of which in the first stage of general and complete disarmament would substantially eliminate the threat of nuclear war. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, we have maintained this point of view since the very beginning

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of the work of the Committee. This is the fundamental premise on which the Soviet Union's draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (EINDC/2/Rev.1) is based. The implementation of the radical measures proposed for the first stage of general and complete disarmament, that is the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles together with the elimination of foreign bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of armed forces from the territories of other States would reliably ensure the achievement of this aim. The Committee has been considering these measures since the time it was first set up. However, it has so far not been possible to achieve the desired progress in this fundamental question, since in the past the representatives of the West have systematically declined to adopt radical measures which would preclude the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war. The absence of a readiness on the part of the Western Powers to come to a reasonable agreement has had the result that consideration by the Committee of the question of general and complete disarmament is virtually at a standstill.

The seriousness of the situation which has arisen and the urgent need to take effective measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war require that all of us should exert the utmost efforts to overcome the obstacles which prevent us from achieving progress in the negotiations.

In accordance with the resolution adopted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations -- I am referring to resolution 1767 (XVII) -- we must set about our work with the determination to achieve a reasonable compromise. Only on this basis is it possible to achieve real progress in solving the question of general and complete disarmament as well as on other problems which are under consideration by the Committee.

To reach agreement on such a difficult and complex question as that of general and complete disarmament, which closely affects the security of States, is undoubtedly no simple matter. As I have already said, it requires that all participants in the negotiations should display sufficient goodwill, boldness and determination to satisfy the insistent demands of all the peoples in regard to eliminating the threat of war and ensuring peace and security throughout the world.

(Mr. Kurnia, Czechoslovakia)

Furthermore, it requires patient efforts aimed at seeking out mutually acceptable solutions in order to achieve progress in our negotiations. The delegations of the socialist countries are systematically guided by this point of view in their activities.

In this connexion, I should like once more to draw attention to the changes which the Government of the Soviet Union, in agreement with the socialist countries, has made in its original draft treaty on general and complete disarmament in order to meet the position of the Western countries. The Government of the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to agree to a lengthening of the period for the implementation of general and complete disarmament both as a whole and in the first stage. It met the position of the Western Powers also in regard to determining the levels to which the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States should be reduced in the first stage of disarmament. The Government of the Soviet Union also agreed that the process of eliminating conventional armaments should be carried out by way of a percentage reduction, as desired by the Western Powers. As regards measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war, the Soviet Union has included in its draft treaty several provisions which take into account the proposals of the Western Powers on this question. In regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons the socialist countries have emphasized their readiness to carry out the necessary measures in the first stage, if the Western Powers agree to this.

And finally, as is well-known, in September this year the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, announced at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that, in a desire to achieve progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the Government of the Soviet Union had taken a further important step in respect of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It agreed that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a strictly limited agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, which would be located exclusively on their respective territories and which would be destroyed only in the second stage of general and complete disarmament, after the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

We regard this step of the Soviet Government as further evidence of its sincere desire to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. It would be something we would welcome, if the Western Powers showed the same flexibility, goodwill and readiness to come to an agreement as the Soviet Union has done.

It can be noted, however, that on the basic questions the Western Powers are still clinging to their old positions and I should like to say quite frankly that in this regard the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy at our last meeting gave us very little hope. It was just as though there had been no recent international crisis or insistent demand of world opinion for the earliest possible implementation of general and complete disarmament. It was just as though there had been no debate on disarmament at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the result of which was the adoption of resolution 1767 (XVII) calling for the "conclusion at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament".

Our Western colleagues have submitted no new proposals on the problems of general and complete disarmament, which were and remain our main task, but, on the contrary, in their statements they have directed their main attention to everything else except general and complete disarmament.

I should like to stress the fact that we are not belittling the importance of the questions touched on by the Western representatives. In our opinion, however, at the present time we should concentrate all our forces on the basic problem which affects the vital interests of mankind, namely, the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

In their statements at our last meeting, the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy reaffirmed their determination to achieve progress in the matter of disarmament. We welcome those statements. At the same time, I should like to say quite frankly that other arguments which we hear today in the West and which are utterly contrary to the interests of disarmament cannot but cause us to have misgivings. I am referring to certain information which is being published in connexion with the forthcoming meeting of NATO in Paris. As part of the preparation for this meeting, we hear of plans for increasing the war potential of the West in central Europe, for deploying a substantial number of units along the line of contact between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact in accordance with the so-called "forward strategy". In this connexion we hear statements about

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the need to act from a "position of strength". As regards the Federal Republic of Germany, there is the announced intention to continue increasing the strength of the Bundeswehr, as well as to use so-called tactical atomic weapons. I feel bound to draw attention to all these reports in the Western press which are causing us some apprehension.

While emphasizing the urgency of general and complete disarmament, we do not overlook the importance of reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. In our opinion, the most suitable compromise basis for achieving this purpose is still the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28).

The development of events during the recent past has again confirmed two basic facts. The first fact is that the reaching of agreement does not depend on solving technical problems of control, but first and foremost on political decisions, on the will to put an end once and for all to the nuclear armaments race. The second fact is that it has been confirmed, as has been repeatedly emphasized in the past, that we cannot take the path of half measures which would not ensure the cessation of all tests. That would not only mean stopping half way, but, worse than that, under the guise of an alleged partial solution of the problem, it would mean leaving the door open for the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Therefore with all respect we cannot agree with the view of our colleague, Mr. Cavallotti, who in his eloquent statement at our last meeting spoke of the tremendous responsibility incurred by those delegations that would not agree to a partial cessation of tests. We consider that States would assume very much greater responsibility if, by accepting a partial solution, they did in fact open up a possibility for the continuation of the nuclear arms race with all the consequences deriving therefrom. No, a partial solution will not bring us to our goal, which remains the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on the unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. This fact has been pointed out repeatedly at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and it must be taken into consideration. This was expressed very clearly, for instance, by the representative of the Republic of Mali in the First Committee of the General Assembly when he said that a treaty on the partial cessation of tests would merely change the conditions of the competition which, instead of

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taking place in the air or under water, would be merely transferred underground. What we desire, he said, is a comprehensive and complete treaty prohibiting all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests whether in the air, under water or underground (A/C.1/PV.1251, page 4).

Finally, I should like to state briefly our position in regard to concrete measures, the implementation of which would lead to a lessening of international tension and which would create more favourable conditions for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Our delegation has always paid great attention to proposals which were really aimed at achieving this goal. We shall continue to do so in the future. We are more convinced than ever that one of the most important and urgent measures for lessening international tension and thus reducing the danger of outbreak of nuclear war would be the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. This has also been proposed several times by the Government of the Polish People's Republic in agreement with the Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The situation is that three out of the four States which the implementation of this most important measure would concern have already given their unconditional assent. Once again we have to note with regret that the Federal Republic of Germany alone is frustrating the implementation of this useful proposal. This shows once again that the Federal Republic of Germany is aiming, not at carrying out peaceful proposals, but at extending, accelerating and intensifying its military programmes. The creation of nuclear-free zones in other regions of the world as well would undoubtedly have a positive influence on the situation in the world and would help to strengthen confidence in international relations, as would also the adoption of other concrete measures, such as, for instance, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the signing of a non-aggression pact between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and possibly other similar measures.

In conclusion, Mr Chairman, I should like to assure you that the Czechoslovak delegation, in accordance with its Government's instructions, will do its utmost so that the work of our Committee may be crowned, at last, with success. Our people and our whole community, like the peoples of the whole world, sincerely desire to bring about general and complete disarmament.

Permit me to express the hope and conviction that the forthcoming stage of the work of our Committee will make the progress we desire. Only in this way

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can we justify the hopes placed upon us by the peoples of the world and only in this way will our work be, not a waste of time, but a contribution to the task of ensuring peace and security throughout the world.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like to make just a few brief remarks on the very interesting suggestions made this morning by the representative of Sweden with regard to a nuclear test ban treaty. All the members of this Conference will recall that the United States and the United Kingdom have presented a draft comprehensive treaty, which is before the Conference as document ENDC/58. That treaty, which we presented on 27 August last, would ensure the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time under effective international supervision and control.

In addition to that comprehensive treaty, in response to appeals made on humanitarian grounds by a number of representatives at this Conference, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed a partial test ban treaty (ENDC/59) which would ensure the ending of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, without the need for additional measures of verification. We are prepared to sign that treaty immediately. We should, of course, prefer to sign the comprehensive treaty banning all tests, and we are also prepared to sign that treaty immediately.

The treaty which would end all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would stop all further danger from radioactive debris from such tests and those dangers which many representatives here have desired should be eliminated would be immediately terminated. But, unfortunately, the Soviet Union says "No".

We believe that either of those treaties would, if signed, go far towards reaching our goal of an effective test ban. We have, of course, as is well known, had most unfortunate experiences in the past with unilateral pledges or obligations to cease testing without effective international control. The last such arrangement, as all delegations will recall, was ended by the massive series of Soviet tests which began in the atmosphere in September 1961, and, if various conversations which Chairman Khrushchev has had with several persons are correctly reported in the Press, those Soviet tests apparently have not yet ended. We cannot repeat that experience and accept unilateral pledges or obligations to cease testing without effective control.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The proposal made by the delegation of Sweden includes some form of a moratorium arrangement, although, as I understood it from the verbatim record, it also takes into account paragraph 6 of the General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII) which, in effect, provides that any interim arrangement for the cessation of tests should include

"adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission;" (ENDC/63, p.3)

In the absence of incontrovertible scientific evidence of the highest order to the contrary, we continue to believe that the detection stations on various countries' territories and compulsory on-site inspection by the commission provide the most effective and objective method for both detecting and identifying seismic events. This is not a new position on the part of the United States. It is one which we have constantly put forward.

The United States for its part has been spending a great many millions of dollars in an effort to improve the methods of detecting seismic events in order that we could arrive at a comprehensive treaty which would ban all tests in all environments. Not only are we prepared to sign that treaty but, last year, in August 1961, we told our friends in the Soviet Union that we were prepared to remove the threshold. The United States for its part has constantly endeavoured to advance this scientific area. We have made public all of our scientific research and have invited comment from all over the world. We shall continue to conduct research in this field in an effort to advance the scope of scientific knowledge in this area of seismology.

We are quite prepared to sit down together with scientists from the Soviet Union, or with scientists of any countries, in order to examine on a most objective basis anything that can be done to advance the field of scientific knowledge in this sphere; and, if it appears to be useful, we are quite prepared to see if it can be used in the drafting of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Of course, we shall wish to study the precise written record of what the representative of Sweden has proposed, and we shall reserve our right to comment later on when we have been able to do that. However, any acceptable arrangement must include those measures of effective international control necessary to ensure the observation of any agreement -- including the necessary detection posts and

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measures of on-site inspection of unidentified events, set up on an orderly and well-organized basis -- in order that the entire public of the world can have confidence in its results.

It will be most helpful to us, in assessing and evaluating the Swedish representative's proposal, to have any further clarification which he may feel able to give us with respect to the means by which his proposal would provide, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII), "adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events", including -- as we still believe to be necessary for appropriate identification -- on-site inspection during the period in which he has proposed all testing, including underground tests, should cease.

I am sure that the representative of Sweden, and all the other representatives here, are fully aware of the stand the Government of the United States takes against uninspected, uncontrolled moratoria, and of our most unfortunate and unhappy experiences with such uncontrolled moratoria. Nevertheless we should like to thank the representative of Sweden for a most interesting contribution. I can assure him and our fellow representatives that we shall give this matter the most careful consideration.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): Speaking in my capacity as the representative of the United Arab Republic, may I begin by stating the satisfaction of my delegation at the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Furthermore, we must draw hope from the fact that this round of talks begins immediately after the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament and nuclear tests -- deliberations which have brought new elements to our study of those subjects. It may also be significant that this round of talks should begin on the heels of the recent world crisis, which impressed upon the whole world the urgency and the need for disarmament.

Inasmuch as the last recess of this Conference of two and a half months duration was not a vacation, and inasmuch as those new elements were added to the picture, my delegation would express the hopes that our talks here at Geneva should mark the beginning of a new phase. They should be forward-looking and not a mere re-hash of oft repeated and well known positions. The world did not stand still during these two and a half months, as scores of States have expressed their ideas during

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the United Nations General Assembly debate on disarmament and nuclear tests. The United Nations General Assembly passed important resolutions affecting the course of our work here, and it should be only natural and practical not to overlook the contributions of those months.

As a small, non-aligned and non-nuclear State, the United Arab Republic is mindful of the fact that, when it comes to disarmament negotiations, the world, apart from the nuclear Powers, has rightly claimed its role as a very actively interested partner in the disarmament and test ban negotiations. These deliberations at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly have definitely shown this to be true. The delegation of the United Arab Republic is therefore aware of its responsibility to the United Nations General Assembly and to world public opinion at large. The representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, has eloquently expressed the feeling of, I dare say, all the eight non-aligned Member States of our Committee on this matter. We see value in the directives of the United Nations General Assembly and in its mandate.

If we turn our attention to the United Nations General Assembly's latest directives and resolutions we will find foremost among them a general concern over the continuation of tests, and a recognition of the fact that public opinion everywhere condemns tests and demands their cessation immediately, and in any case not later than 1 January 1963 -- an acknowledgment of the fact that their continuation increases world tension and does not contribute to agreement on disarmament. Furthermore the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) as a sound, adequate and fair basis for negotiations, as well as for an interim arrangement suspending all underground nuclear tests to accompany an agreement prohibiting tests in the other three environments. Since both parties agreed in principle to the possibility of ending tests by 1 January 1963, should we not redouble our efforts during the coming weeks in order to be able to meet this target date and in order that our first progress report to the United Nations General Assembly, to be delivered by 10 December 1962, should be meaningful?

When we turn our attention to the question of general and complete disarmament, we find encouragement in the spirit of compromise that prompted modifications on both sides, especially the latest modification introduced by Mr. Gromyko at the United Nations General Assembly, which spurred general interest and a desire to explore it further in the light of more clarification. We are encouraged, furthermore, by the

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exchange of letters between Chairman Krushchev, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, in which those three leaders reflected the world's determination to tackle the pending problems of disarmament with renewed determination and vigour in order to spare humanity the dangers of nuclear confrontation. Finally, the statements made at the eighty-third meeting of this Conference by the representatives of the nuclear Powers -- although they harked back to their previous stands -- were yet made in an encouraging and not too controversial tone. Along the same line, the decision to take the war propaganda item away from the pressures of the United Nations General Assembly debate is welcome.

Another source of gratification and hope is the fact that the United Nations General Assembly resolution on disarmament (1767 (XVII)), which was co-sponsored by thirty-three States including my own, was adopted unanimously, even though France regrettably abstained. Once again this is a living proof and further evidence of the fact that world public opinion in all countries, large and small, has a direct and real interest in the outcome of these disarmament negotiations. And it is not without significance that the United Nations General Assembly should restate in one breath its determination to "avert the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear confrontation, on which the recent crisis focused attention". It is the first time that this idea has ever been expressed as clearly and as straightforwardly by the United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly has deemed it appropriate and necessary, also for the first time during the disarmament negotiations, to give specific directives on the urgent need for this Conference to turn its attention to collateral measures intended to decrease tension and facilitate disarmament.

The General Assembly has asked our Committee in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1767 (XVII) to report periodically to it on the progress of our work in the field of disarmament. The Acting Secretary-General has brought this to our attention in document ENDC/64 which is now before us. We believe that there is great merit in the Assembly's directives on disarmament, and we urge this Conference to give urgent attention to those matters.

Finally, I should like to end by saying that we hope we will prove to be right in our estimation that the world is determined to draw profit from the recent crisis, and that since the world has come very close to annihilation it should be all the more necessary and possible to agree on ending tests once and for all, and to agree on practical measures intended to decrease tension and facilitate disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I had not intended to inflict a speech on my colleagues this morning, and I intervene now for the purpose of making just a few comments.

I was very interested in the speech of the Swedish representative, and particularly in his remarks on the question of nuclear tests. It is quite clear that he and his delegation have given a great deal of thought to this matter, and, therefore, any comments they make deserve our most careful attention. However, I should like to endorse what the United States representative so clearly stated about the feelings of the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, in regard to the question of a moratorium.

We feel very strongly -- and recent events have borne out this need -- that we must have clear and adequate assurances in relation to any agreement that is entered into. I listened with a great deal of sympathy to what the Swedish representative said when he reminded us of some of the dangers existing in nuclear testing. There are, of course, two different and distinct types of danger. He reminded us in particular of the danger of fallout and the risks -- the extent of which is debatable, although the fact that they exist is not -- that there can be therefrom, not only to those who live now but to generations yet unborn. That is one type of risk.

The other type of risk -- and I think this is what is in the minds of my colleagues -- is the risk that while any form of nuclear testing continues this must give added impetus to the arms race, which everybody wishes to halt.

But in regard to the first type of risk -- and it is, I think, the most compelling one in the minds of many people because it has been referred to so many times round this table -- I must remind my colleagues that the United Kingdom and the United States have tabled a draft treaty which could be signed tomorrow and which would eliminate that risk at once. We tabled that draft treaty in direct response to appeals made to us in this Conference room on many occasions and by many representatives. We tabled it in spite of certain anxieties we had that even in relation to three environments we could not be absolutely certain of its being carried out in certain circumstances. However, we felt it was our duty to heed the feelings and desires expressed here as well as elsewhere. We therefore tabled our draft partial treaty (ENDC/59). In doing so we made it clear that we looked upon it as an interim measure until such time as a complete treaty could be signed. I am frankly still very disappointed that this was not taken up at once while we continued to work on the other environment on which we

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

must seek agreement. I again appeal to the Soviet representative to sign that treaty while we continue to work on the other environment. That surely is the right way in which to proceed, and it would surely provide added incentive towards solving problems in the underground sphere.

In so far as problems in the underground sphere exist -- and this is where our difference of opinion lies -- our position is still that we must have this degree of adequate assurance. I am well aware that the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) which we have discussed on so many occasions contains three separate and distinct points. There is the question of detection, there is the question of an international commission, and there is the question of on-site inspection.

As I understood the Swedish representative this morning, he was directing his mind principally towards the international commission, and I shall wish to study very carefully the proposals and thoughts he has advanced. This is clearly a complicated matter. It is -- as the United States representative has so rightly said -- a matter in which obviously we must have the fullest confidence. Regardless of whatever body is set up we must have the fullest assurance that adequate detection exists and that the information derived therefrom is properly correlated. This, I believe, is understandable, but I am perfectly willing to look at any suggestions in regard to the international commission. Indeed, on many occasions in the past I have invited the Soviet representative to look at this matter with us in the Sub-Committee and to work with us towards achieving results on it.

Of course, the real key to our difficulties -- and I believe everyone realizes this -- lies in the field of on-site inspection. I listened with great care to what the Swedish representative had to say on this subject. I believe that at one stage of his speech he quoted the Swedish Foreign Minister as saying that a group of eminent scientists from politically independent countries could be entrusted with the task of deciding on a purely scientific and technical basis if an inspection was necessary. Immediately after that in his speech the Swedish representative went on to refer to what Mr. Kuznetsov said on 17 August. He said:

"It seems to me that the interpretation of the often-quoted statement of Mr. Kuznetsov in this Conference on 17 August last could well be that the Soviet side does not object to the opening up of such a possibility".

(supra, p. 21)

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Here again I would appeal to the Soviet representative. There have been a number of references to that statement at the General Assembly, but when one examines the statement itself it is highly ambiguous. All we ask is that the Soviet representative should tell us quite simply -- and I do not ask him to do so now, but at some stage -- whether in fact in these circumstances which the Swedish representative envisages the Soviet Union would automatically agree to inspection on every occasion that those scientists so requested. That is a key question. It is a question to which we have never had a clear answer. I believe a clear answer to it could help us materially towards getting an agreement.

These are delicate, difficult and involved matters. I certainly do not wish to make them more so. But I do want to assure the Swedish representative that I have listened with great attention to what he has said. I shall certainly study his speech most carefully to see if it can be of any assistance to us. But I do ask our colleagues to remember the basic, underlying matters of key importance to which I, equally with the United States representative, attach very great importance. We must have adequate assurance in relation to these matters, and we ask for assurance only that undertakings that have been freely given shall be carried out, and that we shall know that they are carried out. That is what we ask for. In the light of recent events, I think it is not too much to ask for.

I am intervening this morning only to indicate that I have listened with some sympathy to what our Swedish colleague has said and to assure him and my other colleagues around this table that I shall certainly study his statement with care and that I shall look forward to further statements both from him and from others of our colleagues around this table seeking to help us to bridge this gap. I only ask them to understand clearly what the gap is and not to forget how far the Western nations have moved in trying to bridge it.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I have been informed by the co-Chairmen that they have recommended that the Conference should hold its next meeting this Friday and that it should be devoted to a general debate. I assume that that is acceptable to the Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-fourth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 30 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.